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Abstract 
On 1 July 2012, the carbon pricing mechanism commenced in Australia with the 
aim of reducing emissions and encouraging investment in clean energy. A 
substantial proportion of Australia’s emissions are attributable to the coal-fired 
electricity generation sector. This article examines whether the carbon pricing 
mechanism will effectively facilitate emissions reduction from the coal-fired 
electricity sector. Aspects analysed include the legislative constraints placed on 
the carbon price, the carbon pollution cap and provisions specific to the coal-
fired electricity sector, such as transitional assistance. It is concluded that, in 
practice, the carbon pricing mechanism may not be sufficient in itself to achieve 
significant reduction in emissions from coal-fired electricity generation or 
significant investment in clean energy, and that a suite of additional regulatory 
measures, such as the federal Renewable Energy Target, should operate in 
conjunction with the mechanism.  
 
Introduction 
The Australian Government’s plan for addressing climate change and 
securing a clean energy future is outlined in the Clean Energy Future 
legislative package.
1
 A major component of the package is the carbon 
pricing mechanism.
2
 The mechanism places a price on carbon with the 
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1  Australian Government, Securing a Clean Energy Future: The Australian Government’s Climate 
Change Plan (10 July 2011) <http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/Consolidated-Final.pdf> (‘Securing a Clean Energy Future’). 
2  Other components are: (a) support for renewable energy through the establishment of a A$10 
billion commercially oriented Clean Energy Finance Corporation; (b) support for energy 
efficiency including the A$1.2 billion Clean Technology Program; and (c) support for land use 
emissions reductions, including the purchase of carbon credits through the Carbon Farming 
Initiative non-Kyoto Carbon Fund: Australian Government, Clean Energy Future (2012) 
<http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/clean-energy-future/>. 
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aim of creating an incentive for businesses to reduce their carbon 
emissions by investing in clean technology or finding more efficient ways 
of operating.
3
 Implementation of the carbon pricing mechanism occurs 
through the Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) (‘the Act’) and associated 
legislation.
4
 The objects of the Act are to: 
 give effect to Australia’s international obligations; 
 support the development of a global response to climate change 
to prevent an average global temperature increase of more than 
two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels; 
 take flexible and cost-effective action towards reducing 
Australia’s emissions by 80 per cent below 2000 levels by 2050; 
and 
 price carbon in a way that encourages investment in clean energy, 
supports jobs and competitiveness in the economy, and supports 
Australia’s economic growth while reducing pollution.5 
 
The clean energy legislation is the fourth (and first successful) attempt to 
introduce an emissions trading scheme in Australia.
6
 It was enacted in a 
highly sensitive political atmosphere. This is reflected in the objects of 
the Act, which attempt to strike a balance between environmental, 
economic and social factors.
7
 Given Australia’s reliance upon emissions-
                                                                
3  Australian Government, Carbon Price (2012) <http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/clean-
energy-future/carbon-price/#content00>. 
4  Clean Energy (Charges — Customs) Act 2011 (Cth); Clean Energy (Charges — Excise) Act 
2011 (Cth); Clean Energy (International Unit Surrender Charge) Act 2011 (Cth); Clean Energy 
(Unit Issue Charge — Auctions) Act 2011 (Cth); Clean Energy (Unit Issue Charge — Fixed 
Charge) Act 2011 (Cth); Clean Energy (Unit Shortfall Charge — General) Act 2011 (Cth); 
Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011 (Cth); Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (Cth). 
5  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 3. 
6  The first three were: (a) the 2004 Labor State Government initiative to establish an emissions 
trading scheme: National Emissions Trading Taskforce, Possible Design for a National 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (August 2006) 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/reduce/~/media/government/reduce/NETT-
Discussion-paper-for-design-of-scheme-20060801-PDF.pdf> (‘Possible Design for a National 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme’); (b) the 2006 announcement of a federal Task 
Group on Emissions Trading: see Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading, Report of 
the Task Group on Emissions Trading (31 May 2007) 
<http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/72614/20070601-
0000/www.pmc.gov.au/publications/emissions/docs/emissions_trading_report.pdf> (‘Task 
Group on Emissions Trading Report’); and (c) the attempts by the Rudd Government in 2009 
and 2010 to enact the federal Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme. See also Rosemary Lyster, 
‘Australia’s Clean Energy Future Package: Are We There Yet?’ (2011) 28 Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal 446, 446. 
7  This reflects the principle of ecologically sustainable development, which requires that economic 
and environmental considerations are effectively integrated into decision-making processes: 
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intensive industries,
8
 from an economic and social perspective it would 
be disastrous to suddenly introduce a high carbon price with no support 
provided to ensure job security, competitiveness and economic growth.
9
 
The Act provides such support through provision of transitional 
assistance to emissions-intensive, trade-exposed industries and coal-fired 
electricity generators.
10
 
 
From an environmental perspective, the Act is directed towards reducing 
emissions. This is done for the purpose of meeting Australia’s 
international and domestic target of reducing emissions by five per cent 
below 2000 levels by 2020.
11
 Notably, the electricity generation sector is 
responsible for over one-third of Australia’s emissions.12 Coal-fired 
electricity generation in particular comprises 75 per cent of electricity 
produced.
13
 Therefore, as a major source of emissions, effective reduction 
of emissions from coal-fired electricity generation is crucial to the overall 
effectiveness of the carbon pricing mechanism. 
 
This article examines the application of the carbon pricing mechanism to 
the coal-fired electricity generation sector, and whether it will effectively 
facilitate emissions reduction from this sector. A number of features are 
                                                                                                                       
Australian Government, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (1 May 1992), [3.2], 
[3.4] <http://www.environment.gov.au/about/esd/publications/igae/index.html> 
(‘Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment’). 
8  Such as steel, aluminium, cement and zinc manufacturing, coal mining and coal-fired electricity 
generation. See also Ross Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Draft Report 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2008) ch 8. 
9  These social and economic factors are reflected in the Act’s objects ‘to price carbon in a way that 
… supports jobs and competitiveness in the economy; and supports Australia’s economic growth 
while reducing pollution’: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 3(d). 
10  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) pts 7 (Jobs and Competitiveness Program), 8 (Coal-Fired 
Electricity Generation). 
11  Conference of the Parties, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of 
the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 
December 2009 — Addendum — Part 2: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its 
Fifteenth Session, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15, app I; Securing 
a Clean Energy Future, above n 1, 14. 
12  The electricity generation sector accounted for 36 per cent of emissions in the year to December 
2011: Commonwealth Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Australian 
National Greenhouse Accounts: Quarterly Update of Australia’s National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory, December Quarter 2011 (2012), 6 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/climate-change/emissions/2011-
12/NationalGreenhouseGasInventory-QuarterlyReport-December2011.pdf>. 
13  Securing a Clean Energy Future, above n 1, 71; Australian Bureau of Resources and Energy 
Economics, Energy in Australia 2012 (February 2012), 33 
<http://www.bree.gov.au/documents/publications/energy-in-aust/energy-in-australia-2012.pdf>. 
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analysed, including the constraints placed on the carbon price, the carbon 
pollution cap and specific provisions, such as transitional assistance to the 
coal-fired electricity sector. 
 
The intention is that a combination of these features places a price on 
carbon emissions from coal-fired electricity generation. It is expected that 
the carbon price will encourage a move to low-emissions electricity 
generation and, as a consequence, lower overall emissions. However, this 
article concludes that in practice the carbon pricing mechanism may not 
achieve the result of significant emissions reduction from coal-fired 
electricity generation or encourage significant investment in clean energy, 
and that additional regulation is required to drive significant and rapid 
emissions reduction from Australia’s coal-fired electricity generation 
sector. 
 
Overview of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism 
The carbon pricing mechanism aims to reduce Australia’s emissions, 
encourage investment in clean energy and support Australia’s economic 
growth while reducing pollution.
14
 These objects are achieved primarily 
by placing a price on carbon emissions. In theory, a carbon price is 
intended to make emissions-intensive goods and services more 
expensive,
15
 while goods and services produced with low-emissions 
energy or technology will become relatively cheaper. The purpose of the 
carbon pricing mechanism is to change behaviour by lowering demand 
for expensive, emissions-intensive goods and services, and encouraging 
investment in low-emissions (‘clean’) technology, eventually resulting in 
reduction of Australia’s emissions. 
 
The mechanism is comprised of a carbon tax
16
 and a cap-and-trade 
emissions trading scheme. Both are instruments of environmental 
                                                                
14  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 3. 
15  Richard Webb, ‘Securing a Clean Energy Future: Some Economic Aspects’ (Research Paper No 
5, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2011–12) 8. 
16  The authors acknowledge that the use of the phrase ‘carbon tax’ to describe the fixed charge 
years of the carbon pricing mechanism is controversial. However, we are speaking in general 
terms, and do not purport to classify it as a tax for constitutional or taxation law purposes. It has 
been acknowledged that the operation of the carbon pricing mechanism in fixed charge years is 
similar to a tax: International Emissions Trading Association, Greenhouse Gas Market 2011: 
Asia and Beyond: The Roadmap to Global Carbon and Energy Markets (2011), 3 
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regulation that aim to reduce carbon emissions.
17
 A carbon tax is a price 
payable for each tonne of carbon dioxide emitted by a liable entity. A 
cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme involves the government placing 
a cap on the amount of carbon dioxide that can be emitted by covered 
sectors of the economy, and issuing tradeable emissions units up to that 
cap.
18
 Participants must then acquire emissions units to cover their 
emissions.
19
 Theoretically this will encourage participants to invest in the 
most cost-effective ways to reduce emissions,
20
 through either 
introducing methods to reduce their emissions or acquiring emissions 
units from another participant in the scheme.
21
 
 
The carbon pricing mechanism commenced on 1 July 2012 with a fixed 
price on carbon for three years (‘fixed charge years’), which is the 
equivalent of a carbon tax. From 1 July 2015 onwards (‘flexible charge 
years’) a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme will operate, and the 
price of carbon will be determined by the market (subject to a legislative 
price floor and ceiling in the first three flexible charge years). The 
mechanism applies to ‘liable entities’,22 which are required to purchase 
and then surrender an eligible emissions unit for each tonne of carbon 
emitted.
23
 If a liable entity does not surrender enough eligible emissions 
units to cover its emissions, it will incur a unit shortfall charge.
24
 Eligible 
emissions units that can be surrendered are, inter alia, carbon units issued 
by the federal Government through the Clean Energy Regulator.
25
 
                                                                                                                       
<http://www.ieta.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=419:ghg-market-report-
2011&catid=26:reports&Itemid=93>. 
17  See also J Sheehan, ‘Carbon Taxation Versus Emissions Trading Schemes’ (2010) 15(1) Deakin 
Law Review 99; Nicola Durrant, Legal Responses to Climate Change (Federation Press, 2010) 
91–5. 
18  Peter Christoff, ‘Can the Invisible Hand Adjust the Thermostat? Carbon Emissions Trading and 
Australia’ in Tim Bonyhady and Peter Christoff (eds), Climate Law in Australia (Federation 
Press, 2007) 83. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Ibid. 
21  See also Roger Wilkins, Strategic Review of Australian Government Climate Change Programs 
(31 July 2008), 25 <http://www.finance.gov.au/publications/strategic-reviews/docs/Climate-
Report.pdf> (‘Strategic Review of Australian Government Climate Change Programs’). 
22  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 20–22. 
23  Ibid ss 121–134. 
24  Ibid ss 125, 128, 133. The unit shortfall charge will be 130 per cent of the price of carbon units 
in fixed charge years and 200 per cent of the benchmark average annual price for the previous 
year (or an amount specified in the regulations) for flexible charge years: Clean Energy (Unit 
Shortfall Charge — General) Act 2011 (Cth) s 8. 
25  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 5, 94. 
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In fixed charge years, liable entities are required to purchase a carbon unit 
from the Government for each tonne of carbon that they emit. The carbon 
unit is sold at a fixed price and, once purchased, is deemed to be 
immediately surrendered back to the Government. Effectively this creates 
a ‘carbon tax’ by requiring a liable entity to pay a fixed price for each 
tonne of carbon emitted. 
 
In flexible charge years, the Government will put a carbon pollution cap 
in place. This cap is the maximum number of carbon units that the 
Government can issue (through auction or free allocation) for the flexible 
charge year.
26
 Carbon units are purchased by a liable entity at an auction
27
 
and can be either voluntarily surrendered or traded. These features will 
form a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme. The price of carbon units 
will not be fixed and, instead, will be the market price at which they are 
auctioned. A liable entity must surrender an amount of eligible emissions 
units equivalent to its emissions for each flexible charge year. 
 
‘Eligible emissions units’ may be carbon units, eligible international 
emissions units or Australian Carbon Credit Units. Eligible international 
emissions units are emissions units issued in accordance with the Kyoto 
Protocol rules, under another international agreement or under a law of a 
foreign country.
28
 Australian Carbon Credit Units (‘ACCUs’) are carbon 
credit units issued under the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) 
Act 2011 (Cth).
29
 There are certain restrictions that apply to the surrender 
of international emissions units and ACCUs. For the first five flexible 
charge years, eligible international emissions units cannot exceed 50 per 
cent of the units surrendered by a liable entity.
30
 In fixed charge years, 
                                                                
26  Ibid s 13. 
27  Or freely allocated. 
28  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 5; Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011 
(Cth) s 4. 
29  Or of a kind specified in the regulations: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 5. 
30  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 133(7) (eligible international units in excess of 50 per cent will 
be banked for the following eligible financial year). Additionally a sub-limit of 12.5% will apply 
to eligible Kyoto units surrendered by a liable entity: The Hon Greg Combet AM MP - Minister 
for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency and the European Commission, ‘Australia and 
European Commission agree on pathway towards fully linking emissions trading systems’ (Joint 
Media Release, 28 August 2012) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/minister/greg-
combet/2012/media-releases/August/JMR-20120828.aspx>. 
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ACCUs cannot exceed five per cent of the units a liable entity 
surrenders.
31
 Once the flexible charge years commence, there are no 
restrictions on the amount of ACCUs that can be surrendered by a liable 
entity. 
 
Figure 1: The Carbon Pricing Mechanism. 
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Regulations may prevent certain international units from being surrendered to ensure the 
environmental integrity of the scheme: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 123. 
31  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 125(7), 128(7), (8). 
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Legal Framework for Regulation of Emissions from Coal-Fired 
Electricity Generation 
Upon commencement, the carbon pricing mechanism became Australia’s 
key legal instrument for the regulation of emissions from coal-fired 
electricity generation. There are also a number of pre-existing State, 
Territory and federal laws that regulate emissions
32
 from that sector. 
These laws can be divided into two main categories:  
(a) laws regulating emissions through environmental and planning 
approvals for new coal-fired electricity generation; and  
(b) laws aimed at regulating or reducing emissions from existing coal-
fired electricity generation and/or encouraging investment in low-
emissions or renewable electricity. 
 
(a) Laws to regulate emissions from new coal-fired electricity 
generation 
First, the approval of new coal-fired electricity generation is regulated 
under State and Territory environmental and planning laws.
33
 Emissions 
from a new generation complex may be regulated at two stages of 
                                                                
32  Or could be applied to regulate emissions. 
33  Generally, both environmental approval and planning/development approval must be obtained: 
Planning and Development Act 2007 (ACT) s 199; Environment Protection Act 1997 (ACT) s 
42, sch 1 pt 1.2 item 25; Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) s 89E; State 
Environmental Planning Policy (State and Regional Development) 2011 (NSW) sch 1 item 20 
(environmental approval required where the power station has a capital investment value of more 
than A$30 million, or has a capital investment value of more than A$10 million and is located in 
an environmentally sensitive area of State significance); Protection of the Environment 
Operations Act 1997 (NSW) s 48, sch 1 pt 1 cl 17; Planning Act (NT) s 44; Sustainable Planning 
Act 2009 (Qld) ss 232(1)(c), 238; Sustainable Planning Regulation 2009 (Qld) reg 9, sch 9 pt 1 
table 2; Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 19; Environmental Protection Regulation 
2008 (Qld) reg 17, sch 2 pt 3 item 14 (development approval required for generating electricity 
by using fuel at a rated capacity of 10MW electrical or more); Development Act 1993 (SA) ss 32, 
33(1)(a) or ss 46(5)(d), 48; Environment Protection Act 1993 (SA) ss 35, 36, sch 1 pt A item 
8(2); Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (Tas) ss 57, 58, div 2A; Planning and 
Environment Act 1987 (Vic) s 47; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic) s 19A; Environment 
Protection (Scheduled Premises and Exemptions) Regulations 2007 (Vic) sch 1 item K; 
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) s 162(1); Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 
52; Environmental Protection Regulations 1987 (WA) sch 1 item 52 (environmental approval 
required for power station where its production capacity is 10 megawatts or more in aggregate). 
A coal-fired electricity generation complex may also require Commonwealth approval where the 
generation complex will have a significant impact on a matter of national environmental 
significance: Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 67, 67A, 
pt 9. Currently, ‘matters of national environmental significance’ are limited to World Heritage 
properties, National Heritage properties, wetlands of international importance (Ramsar 
Wetlands), nationally listed threatened species and ecological communities, listed migratory bird 
species, protection of the environment from nuclear actions, Commonwealth marine areas and 
the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park: Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 (Cth) ss 12–24C. 
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approval: during the decision to grant an environmental or planning 
approval (including environmental impact assessment); or during the 
imposition of conditions upon the approval. Decisions to grant an 
environmental or planning approval for a new coal-fired generation 
complex may consider greenhouse gas emissions.
34
 However, this factor 
is rarely given any weight in the decision.
35
 Conditions of approval
36
 may 
be used to impose an emissions intensity standard or carbon capture and 
storage-ready (‘CCS-ready’) standard on new coal-fired electricity 
generation. For example, in Queensland, mandatory conditions of 
approval are imposed, requiring that new coal-fired power stations: 
 use best-practice low-emissions technology to achieve the lowest 
possible levels of emissions; and  
 are CCS-ready and will retrofit that technology within five years 
of CCS being proven on a commercial scale.
37
  
In other jurisdictions, conditions of approval for emissions intensity 
standards or CCS-ready standards are imposed on a discretionary basis
38
 
or not at all.
39
 
                                                                
34  For further discussion of the consideration of emissions in granting environmental or 
planning/development approval, see Sharon Christensen et al, ‘Regulating Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Coal Mining Activities in the Context of Climate Change’ (2011) 28 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 381, 398–407. 
35  Ibid 404–7. 
36  Planning and Development Act 2007 (ACT) ss 162(1)(b), 165; Environment Protection Act 1997 
(ACT) ss 49(1)(a), 51; Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) s 89E(1)(a); 
Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW) ss 63, 65–76; Planning Act (NT) ss 
55, 56; Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 73B; Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) ss 
243(b)(i), 244 (see also ch 6 pt 5 div 6 ‘Conditions’); Development Act 1993 (SA) ss 42, 45, 
48(2)(b)(i); Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (Tas) ss 51(3A), 60U; Environmental 
Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 (Tas) ss 25(6), (8); Planning and Environment Act 
1987 (Vic) ss 61(1)(b), 62; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic) s 19B(7)(b); Environmental 
Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 45(1); see also Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 133(2)(f), 134. 
37 Queensland Government, Conditions for New Coal-fired Electricity Generation (last updated 23 
August 2012) <http://www.deedi.qld.gov.au/energy/coal-fired-elec-gen.htm> (accessed 19 
September 2012). 
38  See, for example, New South Wales Government, NSW Government Submission to the 
Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism: A Cleaner Future for Power 
Stations — Interdepartmental Task Group Discussion Paper (February 2011), 3, 6 
<http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/sustainbility-and-climate-
change/NSW_Government_Submission_A_Cleaner_Future_for_Power_Stations.pdf> (and 
implemented in the project approval for the Munmorah Rehabilitation and in the concept plan 
approvals for the Bayswater B; Mount Piper extension Power Stations, 2010); Victorian 
Environmental Protection Agency, Works Approval Issued Under Section 19B of the 
Environment Protection Act 1970 (20 May 2011), [2.1], [3.1] 
<http://www.epa.vic.gov.au/compliance-enforcement/comments/docs/20110520110000184.pdf> 
(upheld in Dual Gas Pty Ltd v Environmental Protection Authority [2012] VCAT 308 (29 March 
2012) — condition 3.1 was specifically upheld at [284]); Environmental Protection Agency, 
 10 
(b)  Laws to regulate emissions from existing coal-fired electricity 
generation 
Secondly, there are numerous laws and policies that aim to reduce 
emissions from existing coal-fired electricity generation, and/or 
encourage uptake of low-emissions or renewable energy sources.
40
 These 
laws include the Queensland Gas Scheme,
41
 energy efficiency measures 
applying to electricity generation,
42
 feed-in tariff laws
43
 and the national 
large-scale Renewable Energy Target.
44
 In addition to these laws, there is 
                                                                                                                       
Bluewaters Power Station Expansion — Phase III and IV, Collie: Report and Recommendations 
of the Environmental Protection Agency (March 2010), 17 
<http://www.epa.wa.gov.au/docs/1349/Rep1349Blue3_4PER8310.pdf> (note: these 
recommendations were not included in the final conditions of approval). 
39  These conditions are not imposed or contemplated in South Australia, Tasmania, the Northern 
Territory or the Australian Capital Territory. Victoria and the Commonwealth have recently 
stated that conditions of approval for new coal-fired power stations will not include emissions 
intensity standards or CCS-ready standards: Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy 
and Tourism, Draft Energy White Paper (13 December 2011), xxi 
<http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/ewp/draft-ewp-2011/Draft-EWP.pdf> (‘Draft Energy 
White Paper’); Victorian Department of Premier and Cabinet, Review of the Climate Change Act 
2010 (December 2011), 35 
<http://www.climatechange.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/136488/111010-Climate-
Change-Review_online.pdf> (‘Review of the Climate Change Act 2010’). 
40  See Sholam Blustein, ‘Towards Low Emissions in the Electricity Generation Sector: Creating a 
Coherent Legal Model for Australia’ (2011) 28 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 77 for 
further discussion of these laws.  
41  Queensland electricity retailers and other liable parties are required to source a prescribed 
percentage (currently 15 per cent, but may be increased up to 18 per cent for any year after 2010: 
Electricity Act 1994 (Qld) s 135ELA; Electricity Regulation 2006 (Qld) reg 134A) of their 
electricity from gas-fired generation: Electricity Act 1994 (Qld) pt 5A; Queensland Government, 
Queensland Gas Scheme (10 September 
2012)<http://www.business.qld.gov.au/industry/energy/gas/queensland-gas-scheme/how-gas-
scheme-works> (accessed 19 September 2012). 
42  See, for example, New South Wales Energy Savings Action Plans (Energy and Utilities 
Administration Act 1987 (NSW) pt 6A); the Commonwealth Energy Efficiency Opportunities 
Program (Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Energy Efficiency 
Opportunities (28 February 2012) 
<http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/efficiency/eeo/pages/default.aspx>. A market-based energy 
efficiency obligation scheme in the form of a National Energy Savings Initiative is currently also 
under consideration: Commonwealth Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency and 
Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Issues Paper: National Energy 
Savings Initiative (December 2011) 
<http://climatechange.gov.au/en/government/initiatives/~/media/government/submissions/nesi/N
ESI-IssuesPaper-20120119-PDF.pdf>. 
43  Feed-in tariff laws compel electricity retailers to enable renewable electricity generation facilities 
to connect to the electricity grid. Electricity retailers are then required to purchase any electricity 
generated by the connected renewable electricity source at a fixed price: Blustein, above n 40, 
12, citing Janet Sawin, ‘Policy Lessons for the Advancement and Diffusion of Renewable 
Energy’ (Paper presented at the International Conference for Renewable Energies, Bonn, 
Germany, June 2004) 4.  
44  The large-scale Renewable Energy Target aims to generate 20 per cent of Australia’s electricity 
from renewable sources by 2020. The Target obliges wholesale electricity purchasers to acquire 
renewable energy certificates, which represent renewable energy generated in Australia, that are 
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the possibility that State and Territory environmental harm and pollution 
offences could be applied to regulate emissions from coal-fired electricity 
generators.
45
 The impact of the carbon pricing mechanism on the existing 
legal framework will be examined later in this article. 
 
Application of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism to the Coal-Fired 
Electricity Sector 
The carbon pricing mechanism differs from pre-existing laws that 
regulate emissions
46
 from the coal-fired electricity sector. It is the first 
Australian law that directly places a price on emissions from coal-fired 
electricity generation. The mechanism applies to persons who are a liable 
entity under the Act.
47
 This occurs where, during an eligible financial 
year: 
 a person had operational control of a facility; and 
 the total amount of covered emissions from the operation of the 
facility was equivalent to 25 000 tonnes or more of carbon 
dioxide.
48
 
 
A coal-fired electricity generation complex is a facility as defined under 
the Act,
49
 and covered emissions are emissions directly resulting from the 
operation of the generation complex.
50
 Consequently, a person with 
                                                                                                                       
equal to a percentage of their annual electricity purchases. It is implemented through the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth); Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 
2001 (Cth); Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Act 2000 (Cth). For a summary of the 
Renewable Energy Target, see Nicola Durrant, ‘The Australian Response to Climate Change: 
Business as Usual or Legal Innovation?’ (2010) 22(3) Environmental Law and Management 
Journal 105, 109–10; Commonwealth Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 
Renewable Energy Target (13 September 2012) 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/renewable-target.aspx>. Note that the 
Renewable Energy Target is currently under review: Australian Government Climate Change 
Authority, Renewable Energy Target Review: Issues Paper (August 2012) 
<http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/sites/climatechangeauthority.gov.au/files/RET-Review-
20120820.pdf> (accessed 19 September 2012). 
45  This is highly unlikely in practice: see, for example, Gray v Macquarie Generation [2010] 
NSWLEC 34 (22 March 2010). 
46  Or could be applied to regulate emissions. 
47  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 20–22. 
48  Ibid s 20. A liable entity may also include a participant in a designated joint venture or the holder 
of a liability transfer certificate: Ibid ss 21, 22. 
49  Ibid s 5; National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) ss 7, 9(1); National 
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Regulations 2008 (Cth) regs 2.15–2.20. 
50  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 5. See also for definition of ‘covered emission’ National 
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) ss 7, 10(1); National Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting (Measurement) Determination 2008 (Cth) ss 1.9, 2.3, sch 1 items 1–6. 
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operational control
51
 of a generation complex that emits 25 000 tonnes or 
more of carbon dioxide in an eligible financial year is a liable entity. A 
liable entity is required to participate in the carbon pricing mechanism 
and surrender an emissions unit for each tonne of carbon emitted by the 
generation complex. 
 
The carbon pricing mechanism aims to change the behaviour of emitters 
and the business model of emissions-intensive industries, such as the 
coal-fired electricity sector. Eventually this should result in significant 
emissions reduction from the coal-fired electricity sector. To achieve 
these goals the mechanism will theoretically operate in the following 
manner. 
 
The carbon price is intended to increase the cost and lower the 
profitability of coal-fired electricity generation. Consequently, changes to 
the business model of coal-fired electricity generators should consist of 
increases in energy efficiency, uptake of other emissions reduction 
methods and, ultimately, closure of coal-fired electricity generation. 
Simultaneously, as the price of carbon rises, investment in low-emissions 
and renewable electricity generation should increase, and in due course 
these sources will become cost-competitive.
52
 Eventually a widespread 
shift from coal-fired electricity generation to low-emissions and 
renewable electricity generation should occur. This will fulfil the 
Government’s aims of pricing carbon in a way that encourages 
investment in clean energy
53
 and ultimately ‘securing a clean energy 
future’.54 
 
                                                                
51  A person has ‘operational control’ where, inter alia, he or she has the authority to introduce or 
implement operating, health and safety and environmental policies: National Greenhouse and 
Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) s 11(1). 
52  Commonwealth Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Australian National 
Greenhouse Accounts: Quarterly Update of Australia’s National Greenhouse Gas Inventory, 
September Quarter 2011 (2012), 20 <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/climate-
change/emissions/2011-09/NGGI-Sept-quarter-2011-PDF.pdf> (‘Australian National 
Greenhouse Accounts’); Ross Garnaut, The Garnaut Review 2011 (Cambridge University Press, 
2011) 158 (‘Garnaut Review’). Gas, hydro, geothermal and nuclear are all potential sources of 
low-emissions electricity generation. 
53  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 3. 
54  Australian Government, Our Plan (10 July 2011) <http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/clean-
energy-future/our-plan/>. 
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In theory, the carbon pricing mechanism will operate in the above-
mentioned manner. In practice, the effectiveness of the mechanism 
depends on its design and specific features, including: 
 constraints placed on the price of carbon; 
 the carbon pollution cap; and 
 transitional assistance provided to coal-fired electricity 
generators. 
The rate at which behaviour of coal-fired electricity generators is changed 
will be largely determined by the price of carbon and the carbon pollution 
cap. If the price of carbon is high and the carbon pollution cap is strict 
and lowered annually, changes in behaviour and consequently emissions 
reductions will be achieved more rapidly. 
 
The price of carbon is constrained by the provisions of the carbon pricing 
mechanism for the first six years after commencement. For the first three 
years of the carbon pricing mechanism, the carbon price is fixed at A$23, 
A$24.15 and A$25.40 in the years beginning 1 July 2012, 2013 and 2014 
respectively.
55
 This follows the recommendation of Professor Garnaut, 
the Government’s independent climate change advisor, that the initial 
carbon price be in the range of A$20 to A$30.
56
 
 
Once the flexible charge years commence, the price of carbon will be the 
market price at which carbon units are auctioned.
57
 The market price of 
carbon is constrained by a legislative price ceiling for the first three 
flexible charge years.
58
 The price ceiling will be prescribed in 
regulations.
59
 A price floor for the first three flexible charge years was 
originally planned
60
 but this price floor will be abolished in order to 
facilitate linkage with the European Union emissions trading scheme 
once the flexible charge years commence.
61
  
                                                                
55  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 100(1). 
56  The Garnaut Review, above n 52, 71–2. 
57  Or the price that ACCUs/eligible international emissions units are purchased for.  
58  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 100(1). 
59 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 100(1). 
60 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 111(5). 
61 The Hon Greg Combet AM MP - Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency and the 
European Commission, ‘Australia and European Commission agree on pathway towards fully 
linking emissions trading systems’ (Joint Media Release, 28 August 2012) 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/minister/greg-combet/2012/media-releases/August/JMR-
20120828.aspx>  (accessed 26 November 2012). 
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Will a Price on Carbon of Itself Lead to Lower Emissions? 
Modelling of the carbon price necessary to facilitate a switch away from 
coal-fired electricity generation towards low-emissions or renewable 
electricity generation has been completed by Deloitte.
62
 A widespread 
switch in electricity-generation sources would achieve significant 
emissions reduction from Australia’s electricity sector. 
 
According to the modelling, where the carbon price is less than around 
A$30 per tonne, existing black coal-fired generation complexes will 
continue to provide the lowest-cost electricity generation.
63
 
Consequently, actual abatement of black coal-fired electricity generation 
may be minimal.
64
 A carbon price of well above A$30 per tonne and most 
likely around A$40 per tonne
65
 is needed to replace existing coal-fired 
electricity generation with new baseload
66
 gas-fired electricity 
generation.
67 
Similarly, the carbon price must reach A$35 to A$45 per 
tonne before electricity from wind could be regarded as comparable in 
cost to coal-fired electricity.
68
 A carbon price of A$50 per tonne is 
required for hydro, geothermal, gas and nuclear to become the most 
competitive baseload electricity-generation technologies.
69
 
 
                                                                
62  Deloitte, Investment Reference Group Report: A Report to the Commonwealth Minister for 
Resources and Energy (Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, April 
2011) <http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/Energy-Security/IRG-report.pdf> (‘Investment 
Reference Group Report’); Jon Stanford, Power Generation in a Carbon Constrained World: 
Implications for the Australian Resources Sector (June 2009) Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
<http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
Australia/Local%20Assets/Documents/Implications%20of%20CPRS.pdf> (‘Power Generation 
in a Carbon Constrained World’). 
63  In the National Electricity Market (which comprises New South Wales, Victoria, Australian 
Capital Territory, South Australia, Queensland and Tasmania): Investment Reference Group 
Report, above n 62, 52. 
64  Ibid. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Baseload electricity is the minimum amount of power that a utility or distribution company must 
make available to its customers, or the amount of power required to meet minimum demands 
based on reasonable expectations of customer requirements. 
67  Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Electricity Generation Investment Analysis: Final Report (14 April 
2011), 35 <http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/Energy-Security/Deloitte-Draft-Report-on-
Electricity-Investment-01.pdf>. The carbon price would need to be around A$60–$70 per tonne 
for significant displacement of existing coal generation output by gas generation (where gas 
prices reached world parity, or in the Western Australian market, respectively): Investment 
Reference Group Report, above n 62, 29, 52. 
68  Grant Anderson, ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Impact on the Mining and Energy 
Industries’ (2008) 31(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 931, 935. 
69  Power Generation in a Carbon Constrained World, above n 62, 9. 
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This modelling raises the question of when Australia’s carbon price will 
reach the level required for a significant switch from coal-fired to low-
emissions or renewable electricity generation. The price of carbon in 
fixed charge years (A$23 to A$25.40 per tonne) will not facilitate a 
switch away from coal-fired electricity generation.
70
 This is consistent 
with statements by representatives of coal-fired electricity generators that 
a carbon price in the A$20 to A$30 range ‘will have no impact 
whatsoever’.71 
 
In the first three flexible charge years, the carbon price ceiling may 
prevent the price from rising high enough to facilitate a switch away from 
coal-fired electricity generation. The price ceiling will be $20 above the 
expected price for European carbon allowances in the 2015-16 
compliance year.
72
 European carbon allowances were trading at around 
€7.5 in 201273 and are likely to be priced between €9 and €12 in 2015.74 
Additionally, Treasury modelling, assuming that there will be a 
coordinated international policy regime by 2016 under a ‘medium global 
action scenario’,75 predicts that the international price of carbon will not 
                                                                
70  It is acknowledged that in the ‘fixed’ price period (the first three years), prices may not be high 
enough to change consumer and business behaviour greatly: Webb, above n 15, 9. 
71  Evidence to Senate Select Committee on the Scrutiny of New Taxes, Parliament of Australia, 
Canberra, 29 April 2011, 2 (Shirley In’t Veld, Verve Energy). 
72 The price ceiling will rise by 5 per cent in real terms in the 2016-17 and 2017-18 compliance years: 
Australian Government, Linking and Australian Liable Entities (2012) 
<http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/linking-and-australian-liable-entities/> (accessed 20 
September 2012).  
73 Thomson Reuters Point Carbon News, Carbon Market Daily (19 September 2012) 9(184) 1 
<http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly_fs/1.1993555!CMD20120919.pdf> (accessed 20 
September 2012)) 
74 Carbon futures for December 2015 were trading at €9 in September 2012 (Thomson Reuters Point 
Carbon News, Carbon Market Daily (19 September 2012) 9(184) 1 
<http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly_fs/1.1993555!CMD20120919.pdf> (accessed 20 
September 2012)) while research by Bloomberg New Energy Finance forecasts the price of 
carbon in Europe will be around $12 a tonne in 2015 (Australian Financial Review, Carbon 
price set to plunge (28 August 2012) 
<http://afr.com/p/national/carbon_price_set_to_plunge_kLbP9Bi0bx9M6gViWdrzdL> (accessed 
20 September 2012)).  
75 The ‘medium global action scenario’ assumes countries implement the  
less ambitious end of their mitigation pledges made in the Cancun Agreements and 
Copenhagen Accord, and stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations at 550 ppm by around 
2100: Commonwealth Treasury, Strong Growth, Low Pollution: Modelling a Carbon 
Price (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) 3 
<http://cache.treasury.gov.au/treasury/carbonpricemodelling/content/report/downloads/
Modelling_Report_Consolidated.pdf> (accessed 23 April 2012) (‘Strong Growth, Low 
Pollution: Modelling a Carbon Price’). 
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rise above US$50 until after 2028.
76
 These factors indicate that the price 
of European Union carbon allowances is likely to be relatively low in 
2015 and for a number of years thereafter.   
 
The combination of Australia’s carbon price ceiling, and the likelihood of 
relatively low European Union carbon prices from 2015 onwards, will 
keep the carbon price from rising high enough in the first three flexible 
charge years to significantly reduce coal-fired electricity generation. 
From the fourth flexible charge year onwards, commencing 1 July 2018, 
no price ceiling will apply. After the price ceiling is removed, the carbon 
price is predicted to reach $29 per tonne by 2020 under several different 
carbon pricing scenarios.
77
 This price will still be inadequate to drive a 
widespread switch from coal-fired electricity generation towards low-
emissions or renewable electricity generation. 
 
Modelling of the carbon price may prove incorrect and the price of 
carbon may rise substantially once the price ceiling is removed. However, 
until 1 July 2018 Australia’s carbon price will be constrained by the fixed 
prices, and price ceiling, set out in the Act.
78
 On the basis of the 
modelling, these provisions and the linkage with the European Union 
scheme ensures that the carbon price will not rise high enough to achieve 
a significant reduction in emissions from the coal-fired electricity 
generation sector.
79
 
 
                                                                
76 Ibid 37. 
77 Strong Growth, Low Pollution: Modelling a Carbon Price, above n 75, 5.  
78 Australia’s carbon price is also likely to become dependent on the European Union trading price of 
carbon: ‘Taken together, these changes [linking of the Australian carbon pricing mechanism with 
the European Union emissions trading scheme and removal of the price floor] are expected to 
result in the Australian price being set by the European price from the 2015-16 compliance year’: 
Australian Government, Linking and Australian Liable Entities (2012) 
<http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/linking-and-australian-liable-entities/> (accessed 20 
September 2012). 
79 There is a possibility that the carbon pricing mechanism could be repealed before the carbon price 
rises high enough to facilitate a significant switch away from coal-fired electricity generation. 
The current federal Leader of the Opposition has outlined plans to repeal the Act if elected: 
Liberal Party of Australia, Our Plan to Abolish the Carbon Tax <http://www.liberal.org.au/our-
plan-abolish-carbon-tax> (accessed 20 September 2012). However the linking of the Australian 
carbon pricing mechanism to the European Union emissions trading scheme may complicate any 
attempt to repeal the mechanism.  If successful, repeal of the carbon pricing mechanism is likely 
to occur in fixed charge years, before the carbon price rises high enough to facilitate a switch to 
low-emissions or renewable electricity generation and consequently reduce emissions from coal-
fired electricity generation. 
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Impact of a Carbon Pollution Cap on Emissions Reduction 
The second feature of the carbon pricing mechanism that has a significant 
impact on the rate of emissions reduction from coal-fired electricity 
generation is the carbon pollution cap. During the fixed charge years of 
the mechanism, there is no cap on carbon emissions and entities are 
simply liable to pay the carbon price for their emissions. A carbon price 
alone is unlikely to change the behaviour of coal-fired electricity 
generators who can afford to pay the price and continue emitting. The 
introduction of the carbon pollution cap in flexible charge years may be 
more effective in facilitating behavioural change from coal-fired 
electricity generators. As the cap is lowered over time, demand for the 
right to emit one tonne of carbon (through the purchase of a carbon unit) 
will rise, and so will the associated price of carbon. Accompanied by a 
carbon pollution cap, the price of carbon should eventually rise high 
enough to facilitate a switch from coal-fired electricity generation 
towards low-emissions or renewable electricity generation. 
 
The carbon pricing mechanism requires a carbon pollution cap to be 
imposed, from 1 July 2015 onwards, for each flexible charge year.
80
 As 
previously explained, the carbon pollution cap is the maximum number of 
carbon units that the Government can issue (through auction or free 
allocation) for the flexible charge year.
81
 This cap theoretically places a 
limit on Australia’s annual ‘covered emissions’.82 However, covered 
emissions can exceed the carbon pollution cap where they are offset by 
the surrender of other eligible emissions units, such as eligible 
international units or eligible ACCUs.
83
 The surrender of these units will 
offset any excess covered emissions through the biosequestration of one 
tonne of carbon dioxide (ACCU) or the emission of one tonne less of 
carbon dioxide in a foreign jurisdiction (eligible international emissions 
unit). 
 
The ability to offset Australia’s covered emissions by the surrender of 
international emissions units and ACCUs could create a situation known 
                                                                
80  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 14. 
81  Ibid s 13. 
82  ‘Covered emissions’ do not include emissions from certain sectors, such as emissions from 
agriculture and emissions from closed landfill facilities: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 30. 
83     Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 105. 
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colloquially as a ‘leaky cap’. A leaky cap may occur if large amounts of 
international emissions units and ACCUs are surrendered, allowing 
Australia’s covered emissions to significantly exceed the carbon pollution 
cap. This will be particularly problematic where the international 
emissions units and/or ACCUs surrendered do not represent credible, 
permanent abatement of emissions.
84
 
 
Restrictions on the amount of international emissions units that can be 
surrendered for the first five flexible charge years go some way towards 
preventing a leaky carbon pollution cap.
85
 However, after this time there 
are no limits on the number of international emissions units and ACCUs 
that can be surrendered by a liable entity. From 1 July 2020, a coal-fired 
electricity generator could potentially continue to emit large amounts of 
carbon and surrender corresponding numbers of international emissions 
units and ACCUs to cover its emissions. In this (albeit unlikely) situation, 
the contribution from coal-fired electricity generators to actual reduction 
of Australia’s covered emissions could be negligible. 
 
The Act sets out a structure for the imposition of carbon pollution caps. 
In 2014, by 31 May, the carbon pollution cap must be declared through 
regulations for the flexible charge years beginning 1 July 2015, 2016, 
2017, 2018 and 2019.
86
 Each year, the five years of pollution caps will be 
extended by one year.
87
 Therefore carbon pollution caps will always be 
known five years in advance. In the absence of regulations declaring the 
carbon pollution cap, default carbon pollution caps for all flexible charge 
                                                                
84  For example, there have been concerns raised about the real environmental benefit of some 
Clean Development Mechanism-generated credits (Kyoto credits); in particular, experience with 
reduction in HFC-23 gas and, more generally, the ‘additionality’ of credits from Clean 
Development Mechanism projects: Lisa Caripis et al, ‘Australia’s Carbon Pricing Mechanism’ 
(2011) 2(4) Climate Law 583, 592 (citing Carbon Trust, Global Carbon Mechanisms: Emerging 
Lessons and Implications CTC 748 (2009)). For discussion of potential issues arising from the 
surrender of ACCUs see Nicola Swayne, ‘The Legal Framework for Australia’s Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism: A Critique’ (2011) 5 Environmental Liability 156, 165–6 and more generally Nicola 
Durrant, ‘Legal Issues in Carbon Farming: Biosequestration, Carbon Pricing and Carbon Rights’ 
(2011) 2(4) Climate Law 515. Note, however, that regulations may place restrictions on the 
surrender of eligible international emissions units, having regard to the environmental integrity 
of the Act: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 123(1), (2)(c). 
85  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 133(7) (eligible international emissions units in excess of 50 per 
cent of the total emissions units that a liable entity surrenders will be banked for the following 
eligible financial year).  
86  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 16(1). 
87  Ibid s 16(3). 
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years are set out in the Act.
88
 The default caps follow a trajectory 
consistent with Australia’s commitment to reduce national emissions to 
five per cent below 2000 levels by 2020.
89
 
 
Changing climate science
90
 may indicate that pollution caps must be 
tightened more stringently than currently thought, and therefore caps 
must be flexible and adaptable.
91
 Christoff recommends regular review of 
pollution caps, such as every five years,
92
 which appears to be the 
intended operation of the carbon pricing mechanism. Strict carbon 
pollution caps must be set for each of the flexible charge years, and the 
annual extension of these caps must take recent and accurate climate 
science into account.
93
 Consideration must also be given to the potential 
occurrence of a ‘leaky’ carbon pollution cap, and whether additional 
surrender restrictions are needed to prevent this.
94
 A strict, regularly 
reviewed carbon pollution cap that does not leak excessively should 
facilitate changes in behaviour of emitters, a move towards low-
emissions and renewable electricity generation and, ultimately, emissions 
reduction from the coal-fired electricity sector. 
 
The Impact of Transitional Assistance on the Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism 
The Government considers that a smooth transition to a clean energy 
future is in Australia’s national interest.95 Consequently, secure electricity 
supplies and stable energy markets are essential during the renewal of the 
                                                                
88  Ibid ss 17, 18.  
89  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 106. 
90  For example, the fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is 
due for publication in 2014: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Key Dates in the AR5 
Schedule (10 August 2012), 3 <http://www.ipcc.ch/activities/key_dates_AR5_schedulepdf.pdf>.  
91  Christoff, above n 18, 84. 
92  Ibid 95. 
93  The Act sets out a number of matters (some mandatory and some discretionary) to be taken into 
account by the Minister in making a recommendation about what the carbon pollution cap should 
be: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 14(2). Climate science is not one of them, although the 
Minister must have regard to Australia’s international obligations under international climate 
change agreements (s 14(2)(a)) and may consider estimates of the global emissions budget (s 
14(2)(c)(v)). 
94  Garnaut recommends restrictions on the source and quantity of offset credits that can be used 
under the Australian scheme, although he does not state how long these restrictions should apply 
for: Ross Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) 340–1 <http://www.garnautreview.org.au/pdf/Garnaut_Chapter14.pdf> (‘The 
Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report’). 
95  Securing a Clean Energy Future, above n 1, 74.  
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energy sector.
96
 To ensure energy security and stability, transitional 
assistance is provided to eligible coal-fired electricity generators under 
Part 8 of the Act.
97
 The primary object of Part 8 is the maintenance of 
energy security. The Act contemplates that this will be achieved by 
assisting generators that face sizeable losses in the value of their assets, 
supporting investor confidence and underpinning the investment in 
generation assets required for future energy security.
98
 
 
The social and economic objects of Part 8 are in contrast with the Act’s 
environmental objects of reducing Australia’s emissions and encouraging 
investment in clean energy.
99
 Overall, the carbon pricing mechanism is 
intended to change the behaviour and business model of emitters, 
facilitate a switch to low-emissions or renewable electricity generation 
and, ultimately, reduce emissions. Provision of transitional assistance to 
achieve social and economic outcomes may prevent or delay the 
mechanism from operating in this manner. It is necessary to outline the 
particulars of transitional assistance before the effects of assistance are 
examined. 
 
Transitional assistance is provided to coal-fired electricity generators in 
the form of cash payments and allocation of free carbon units.
100
 In the 
first year of the carbon pricing mechanism, A$1 billion of assistance in 
the form of cash payments is provided.
101 
This is followed by annual 
allocations of free carbon units in the financial years beginning 1 July 
2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.
102
 It appears that a coal-fired electricity 
                                                                
96  Ibid.  
97  See also Clean Energy Regulations 2011 (Cth) pt 8. 
98  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 159. 
99  Ibid s 3. 
100  Ibid s 161 (free carbon units); Commonwealth Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency, Energy Security Fund Cash Payments (9 July 2012) 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/energy-security-fund-cash-
payments.aspx>. 
101  Cash payments were made in June 2012: Commonwealth Department of Climate Change and 
Energy Efficiency, Energy Security Fund Cash Payments: Guidelines for Applications for a 
Certificate of Eligibility for Coal-Fired Generation Assistance (Cash Payments) (3 April 2012), 
6 <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/government/initiatives/esf-
cp/energy-security-fund-cash-payments-guidelines-pdf.pdf> (‘Energy Security Fund Cash 
Payments: Guidelines)’). 
102  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 182. In the financial years beginning 1 
July 2013, 2015 and 2016, 41.705 million free carbon units will be issued per year. The total 
number of units allocated in the 2014–15 financial year may differ from this number and is 
calculated according to a different formula which ensures that no more than 83.41 million free 
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generation complex may receive both a cash payment and free carbon 
units.
103
 Cash payments are an administrative scheme and do not have 
any legislative basis,
104
 while free carbon units are issued under Part 8 of 
the Act. Cash payments and free carbon units combined have an 
estimated value of A$5.5 billion over six years until 2016–17.105 
 
Prerequisites for Free Carbon Units and Cash Payments 
As a general rule, carbon units are issued by the Clean Energy Regulator 
on behalf of the Government.
106
 They can be issued for a fixed charge 
(during fixed charge years) or as a result of an auction conducted by the 
Regulator (during flexible charge years).
107
 Carbon units can also be 
issued for free to coal-fired electricity generators
108
 where the 
requirements set out in Part 8 of the Act are met. First, a generation 
complex must meet the legislative definition. A ‘generation complex’ 
means one, two or more generators of electricity (‘generation units’) at 
the same location.
109
 The generation complex must also: 
 hold a certificate of eligibility for coal-fired generation 
assistance;
110
 
 pass the power system reliability test;111 and 
 provide the Minister with a ‘Clean Energy Investment Plan’ for 
the generation complex.
112
 
 
A certificate of eligibility will only be issued where the ‘generation 
complex assistance eligibility test’ is satisfied.113 This requires the 
                                                                                                                       
carbon units can be issued over the first two years of allocations: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 
161; Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 194, 197. 
103  The application for a certificate for eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance can be for both 
cash payments and free carbon units: Commonwealth Department of Climate Change and 
Energy Efficiency, Application for a Certificate of Eligibility for Coal-Fired Generation 
Assistance (Cash Payments); Application for a Certificate of Eligibility for Coal-fired 
Generation Assistance (Free Carbon Units) (3 April 2012), 7 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/government/initiatives/esf-
cp/ESF-CombinedApplicationForm-20111221-PDF.pdf>. 
104  Energy Security Fund Cash Payments: Guidelines, above n 101, 4. 
105  Securing a Clean Energy Future, above n 1, 117. 
106  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 94. 
107  Ibid s 99. 
108  Ibid s 99(d), pt 8. 
109  Ibid s 5. 
110  Ibid ss 161(1), 165. 
111  Ibid s 169. The power system reliability test is set out in ss 170, 171.  
112  Ibid s 177. 
113  Ibid s 166. 
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generation complex to be connected to an electricity grid of a size 
sufficient to expose it to significant competition from lower-emissions 
electricity generation,
114
 produce electricity from the combustion of 
coal
115
 and have an emissions intensity greater than 1.0.
116
 
 
Once a certificate of eligibility has been issued, the generation complex 
must pass the ‘power system reliability test’ annually to receive free 
carbon units.
117
 This is a complicated test aimed at preserving energy 
security.
118
 It requires that:  
 the ‘nameplate rating’119 of the generation complex has not been 
reduced from its nameplate rating at 1 July 2010;
120
 or 
 the nameplate rating has been reduced and the appropriate energy 
market operator certifies that there is unlikely to be a breach of 
relevant power station reliability standards within two years after 
the reduction/s (‘certification approach’);121 or 
 the nameplate rating has been reduced and the person who owns, 
controls or operates the generation complex constructs and 
nominates new replacement generation capacity (‘replacement 
capacity approach’).122 
 
The power system reliability test generally makes the issue of free carbon 
units conditional upon the continued generation capacity of the complex. 
It is noted that: 
[A]ny conditionality attached to assistance will encourage the recipient of 
assistance to undertake the conditional activity at the expense of other 
                                                                
114  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 189. The generation complex must 
have been connected to a grid with capacity of at least 100 megawatts at any time between 1 July 
2008 and 30 June 2010: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 166(2)(a). 
115  At least 95 per cent of the electricity produced by the generation complex between 1 July 2008 
and 30 June 2010 must have been attributable to the combustion of coal: Clean Energy Act 2011 
(Cth) s 166(2)(b). 
116  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 166(2)(c). 
117  Ibid ss 161(10), 169. 
118  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 184. 
119  ‘Nameplate rating’ means the maximum generation capacity in megawatts of the generation 
complex as published or specified by the relevant energy regulator: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) 
s 5. 
120  Or where the nameplate rating was registered after 1 July 2010, it cannot have decreased from its 
initial registration: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 170(2)(a),(b). 
121  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 170(2)(c). 
122  Ibid ss 170(2)(e)–(g), 171. The nominated generation unit/s must have been registered or fully 
committed on or after 1 July 2011, have output that is readily predictable, and have a likely 
emissions intensity that does not exceed 0.80: s 172. 
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activities. For example, if assistance were made conditional on the 
ongoing production of electricity, the conditionality would increase 
recipients’ electricity generation above the level otherwise determined by 
the market prices of carbon and electricity.
123
 
 
The condition imposed by this test may act as a perverse incentive for a 
generation complex to continue to operate at its full capacity from 1 July 
2010 in order to receive free carbon units. This could occur in the 
following manner. With the introduction of the carbon price (and no 
allocation of free carbon units) a generation complex may have decided 
to retire one or more generation units and continued to operate at a 
diminished capacity. The imposition of the power system reliability test 
may discourage such a decision if it will result in a reduction of the 
generation complex’s nameplate rating and therefore prevent the issue of 
free carbon units. Indeed, it is expressly noted in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Act that the power system reliability test uses the 
value of free carbon units to influence the decisions of owners, operators 
or controllers of generation complexes.
124
 
 
Overall, the power system reliability test may detract from the operation 
of the carbon pricing mechanism. Placing a price on carbon aims to lower 
the profitability of coal-fired electricity generation and encourage 
decisions to reduce or cease this emissions-intensive activity. When 
decisions to cease or continue coal-fired electricity generation are 
influenced by the issue of free carbon units, instead of the carbon price, 
the mechanism will not operate as intended. 
 
In some circumstances the power system reliability test can still be 
satisfied upon partial retirement of a generation complex. This occurs 
where the certification approach
125
 or replacement capacity approach
126
 is 
taken. The replacement capacity approach allows the owner of the 
generation complex to nominate another electricity generation unit, with 
readily predictable output, that was/is registered on or after 1 July 
                                                                
123  Commonwealth Department of Climate Change, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green 
Paper (16 July 2008), 387 <http://www.plantations2020.com.au/assets/acrobat/Greenpaper.pdf> 
(‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper’). 
124  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 200. 
125  Ibid 203; Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 170(1)(c), (d). 
126  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 170(2)(e)–(g), 171, 172. 
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2011.
127
 The generation capacity provided by the newly registered unit 
must be sufficient to replace the reduction in the capacity of the original 
generation complex.
128
 
 
The replacement capacity approach has an objective of ‘sharpening 
incentives for recipients of free carbon units to invest in new low-
emissions capacity to replace existing emissions-intensive capacity’.129 
The achievement of this objective would appear to require that 
replacement capacity must generate low-emissions electricity. However, 
the generation unit/s nominated as replacement capacity can have an 
emissions intensity up to 0.80.
130
 Considering that the average emissions 
intensity for gas-fired electricity generation is only 0.54,
131
 this provision 
does not strictly require ‘low-emissions’ replacement capacity and may 
not assist in achieving the above objective. 
 
Finally, a person who owns, controls or operates a generation complex 
must provide a Clean Energy Investment Plan (‘the Plan’) to the 
Minister.
132
 The Plan must set out the plans, if any, the person has for 
investment in:
133
 
 new electrical-generation capacity; or  
 the reduction of the emissions intensity of a generation complex 
through methods such as efficiency improvements, use of 
alternative fuels or installation of a carbon capture unit;
134
 or  
 research and development in relation to clean energy technology 
such as trials or pilots taking place at a generation complex, or 
                                                                
127  Ibid ss 170(2)(e)–(g), 171, 172. The project must also not have been fully committed by the 
project proponent at 1 July 2011. Whether a project is ‘fully committed’ is determined with 
reference to matters such as the status of planning and construction approvals and licences: s 
172(2)(d). 
128  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 170(2)(e)–(g), 171(5). 
129  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 213. 
130  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 172(1)(f). 
131  Productivity Commission, Carbon Emission Policies in Key Economies, Appendix D: Australia’s 
Electricity Generation Sector (16 December 2011), 5 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/carbon-prices/report> citing Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences, Energy in Australia 2011 (2011) 
<http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/facts-stats-pubs/Energy-in-Australia-2011.pdf>. 
132  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 177. 
133  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 178(a). 
134  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 216. 
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support for research and development programs undertaken 
elsewhere.
135
 
 
This provision appears to require steps to be taken to reduce emissions, 
but lacks substantive legal meaning. It requires a person who owns, 
controls or operates a generation complex to merely ‘set out the plans’ 
they have to reduce emissions and invest in a transition towards low-
emissions electricity generation. There is no additional legal obligation 
for these plans to actually be implemented. There is no legal requirement 
that investment in new electrical-generation capacity or research and 
development must be within a specific range, or done within a specific 
timeframe. There is no legal mandate of the level by which emissions 
intensity must be reduced. Government statements that the Plan is a 
‘transparent public statement of the measures ... companies are taking’136 
and ‘the plan for any given year can be an updated version of the 
previous year’s plan [with] ... no specific requirements on the extent of 
updating required’137 appear to support a conclusion that it does not 
impose any substantive legal obligations to reduce emissions or invest in 
low-emissions electricity generation. 
 
Cash payments were made on an administrative basis
138
 upon satisfaction 
of several of the prerequisites contained in Part 8 of the Act. Coal-fired 
electricity generators were required to pass the generation complex 
assistance eligibility test to receive cash payments.
139
 However, there was 
no requirement for a generation complex to pass the power station 
reliability test or provide a clean energy investment plan to receive cash 
payments. Calculations of both cash payments and free carbon units are 
determined using the methodology outlined below.
140
 
 
Calculation of Free Carbon Units and Cash Payments 
The number of free carbon units and/or the amount of the cash payment 
issued to a generation complex is calculated by reference to its ‘annual 
                                                                
135  Ibid. 
136  Ibid. 
137  Ibid. 
138  Energy Security Fund Cash Payments: Guidelines, above n 101, 20. 
139  Ibid 11; see Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 166. 
140  Energy Security Fund Cash Payments: Guidelines, above n 101, 12, 17; Clean Energy Act 2011 
(Cth) ss 167, 168. 
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assistance factor’ and the total annual assistance factors of all generation 
complexes for that eligible financial year.
141
 The annual assistance factor 
for a coal-fired electricity generation complex is stated in its certificate of 
eligibility.
142
 It is determined using two key elements: 
 the historical energy produced by the generation complex from 1 
July 2008 to 30 June 2010; and  
 its emissions intensity.143 
 
Garnaut recommends that allocations of assistance should be based on the 
average emissions intensity for an industry, rather than the emissions 
intensity of a single recipient, to maintain incentives for reducing 
emissions.
144
 Calculation of free carbon units and/or cash payments is 
influenced by several factors and does not depend entirely upon the 
emissions intensity of the relevant generation complex. However, it 
would appear preferable to disregard the emissions intensity of the 
individual recipient when calculating the number of free carbon units 
and/or the amount of the cash payment to be issued. Calculations could 
be done with reference to the average emissions intensity of the coal-fired 
electricity sector instead. This would create stronger incentives for the 
recipients of assistance to reduce emissions. 
 
Closure of Coal-Fired Electricity Generation 
The operation of the carbon pricing mechanism should lead to closure of 
coal-fired electricity generation. Placing a price on carbon is designed to 
make electricity generation from coal more expensive. This should lower 
the profitability of coal-fired electricity generators and eventually lead to 
their closure. However decisions to close coal-fired electricity generation 
complexes are predicated on a range of factors, of which a carbon price is 
only one. These factors include the timeframes required to construct 
replacement electricity generation,
145
 the long-term investment made in 
                                                                
141  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 161.  
142  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 161(1), 165. 
143  Ibid s 167. ‘Emissions intensity’ is defined in s 168.  
144  Ross Garnaut, Update Paper 6: Carbon Pricing and Reducing Australia’s Emissions (17 March 
2011), 33 <http://www.garnautreview.org.au/update-2011/update-papers/up6-key-points.html>. 
145 To allow Hazelwood and Yallourn power stations to close by 2020,  
approximately 4,400 MW of new gas-fired electricity generation is required over the 
eight years from 2012 to 2020. This compares to nearly 2,200 MW of gas-fired 
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coal-fired electricity generation and long-term contracts which a 
generation complex may be party to.  
 
The Australian Government originally planned to negotiate contracts for 
closure with eligible emissions-intensive electricity generators, with the 
aim of closing around 2000 megawatts of coal-fired generation capacity 
by 2020.
146
 It appears that a significant gap existed between the level of 
compensation sought by electricity generators and the level of 
compensation offered by the Government.
147
 Negotiations did not result 
in the formation of any contracts for the closure of electricity 
generation.
148
 The failure to reach agreement upon contracts for closure 
indicates that the carbon price will not have a severe and rapid impact 
upon the profitability of emissions-intensive electricity generators. 
Instead it appears to confirm modelling which states that the introduction 
of a carbon price will result in closure of three Victorian coal-fired 
generation complexes by 2020, by 2024 and between 2025 and 2030 
respectively.
149
 Such modelling suggests that the impact of the carbon 
price may not be sufficient to drive closure of coal-fired electricity 
generators for ten years or more. In the meantime, coal-fired electricity 
generators will continue to emit substantial amounts of carbon which will 
not be conducive towards meeting Australia’s 2020 emissions reduction 
target.  
 
                                                                                                                       
electricity generators that have been constructed in Victoria since 1979: Review of the 
Climate Change Act 2010, above n 39, 12. 
146 Securing a Clean Energy Future: The Australian Government’s Climate Change Plan, above n 1, 
116. Subject to the outcome of negotiations, the Government intended to enter into any closure 
contracts by 30 June 2012: Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 
Contract for Closure Program: Invitation for Expressions of Interest (30 September 2011) 7 
<http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/cei/CFC/CFC-expression-of-interest.pdf> (accessed 
24 April 2012) (‘Contract for Closure Program: Invitation for Expressions of Interest’). These 
contracts would have been authorised under Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 303A. 
147 Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (Cth), ‘Contract for Closure 
Negotiations Cease’ (Media Release, 5 September 2012) 
<http://minister.ret.gov.au/MediaCentre/MediaReleases/Pages/cfc-cease.aspx> (viewed 26 
November 2012). 
148 Ibid. Coal-fired electricity generators participating in the contract for closure  negotiations were 
Alinta Energy (Playford B in Port Augusta, South Australia), HRL (Energy Brix in Morwell, 
Victoria),  Hazelwood Power Partnership (Morwell, Victoria) (91.8% owned by International 
Power GDF Suez Australia), RATCH-Australia (Collinsville, Queensland) and TRUenergy 
(Yallourn, Victoria). 
149 Contract for Closure Program: Invitation for Expressions of Interest, above n 146, 10.            . 
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Critique of Transitional Assistance Provided to Coal-Fired 
Electricity Generators 
It is likely that transitional assistance for coal-fired electricity generators 
will achieve the maintenance of energy security and ensure stability of 
electricity markets in Australia. However, the provision of transitional 
assistance may also result in a number of detrimental impacts. Potential 
detrimental impacts fall within three broad categories: 
(a) transitional assistance may undermine the effectiveness of the 
carbon pricing mechanism;  
(b) generators that receive free carbon units may pass carbon costs 
through to consumers, resulting in windfall gains for the coal-
fired electricity sector; and  
(c) transitional assistance may conflict with the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development. 
The following section highlights each detrimental impact that may flow 
from the provision of transitional assistance, and examines the 
justifications provided for transitional assistance. 
 
(a) Transitional Assistance may Undermine the Effectiveness of the 
Carbon Pricing Mechanism 
The carbon pricing mechanism should operate to increase the cost of 
coal-fired electricity generation, therefore providing a financial incentive 
for generators to reduce emissions and encouraging cost-competitiveness 
of low-emissions electricity generation sources.
150
 To achieve this, a 
carbon price must be imposed upon coal-fired electricity generators for 
each tonne of carbon dioxide emitted. Allocation of free carbon units will 
present a problem by partially shielding the coal-fired electricity sector 
from the impact of a carbon price. This could have a number of 
consequences. 
 
First, it may take a long time for the cost of coal-fired electricity 
generation to increase to a point where low-emissions or renewable 
electricity generation becomes cost-competitive. Secondly, coal-fired 
electricity generators are not faced with strong financial incentives to 
reduce emissions. Treasury modelling indicates that if the electricity 
                                                                
150  Australian National Greenhouse Accounts, above n 52, 20. 
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sector were to be shielded from a carbon price, electricity emissions 
would remain at around current levels until the late 2020s.
151
 Although 
the allocation of free carbon units only partially shields the coal-fired 
electricity sector from the carbon price for a limited number of years, it 
could have a significant detrimental impact on the rate at which 
Australia’s emissions are reduced, therefore undermining the 
environmental effectiveness of the carbon pricing mechanism. Thirdly, 
once the flexible charge years commence and carbon units are auctioned, 
the allocation of free carbon units makes it difficult to determine what the 
‘natural’ price of carbon units would be.152 Participants who receive free 
carbon units will not need to purchase those carbon units at an auction. 
Demand for carbon units will be lower than it would be without 
transitional assistance and, consequently, the price of carbon units sold at 
auction will also be lower. This will affect the operation of the entire 
carbon pricing mechanism, and not just the coal-fired electricity sector. 
 
According to Christoff, the allocation of free carbon units may interfere 
with the economic efficiency of the mechanism
153
 for the following 
reasons. A price on carbon is designed to drive changes to the business 
model of emitters to achieve emissions reduction at the lowest cost.
154
 
Theoretically this will occur in the following manner. In flexible charge 
years of the carbon pricing mechanism, the trade of emissions units 
should ensure that participants who value units most highly acquire 
them.
155
 Emitters who are willing to pay the most for the right to emit a 
tonne of carbon will acquire substantial numbers of emissions units. 
Other emitters will find cost-effective ways to reduce their emissions and 
acquire fewer emissions units. Overall, the carbon price, and trade in 
                                                                
151  Strong Growth, Low Pollution: Modelling a Carbon Price, above n 75, 121. 
152  Christoff, above n 18, 87. 
153  Ibid 98. 
154 Economic instruments such as the carbon pricing mechanism are chosen because they are 
perceived to be far more efficient than command and control regulation, and capable of 
providing industry with the flexibility and autonomy to make least cost decisions: Neil 
Gunningham, ‘Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures’ (2009) 
21(2) Journal of Environmental Law 179, 185. See also Paul O’Brien and Ann Vourc’h, 
‘Encouraging Environmentally Sustainable Growth: Experience in OECD Countries’ 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Economics Department Working 
Paper No 293, 2001), 5 <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/encouraging-environmentally-
sustainable-growth_046738633224>. 
155  ‘In a perfectly competitive market, units will flow to their highest-valued use’: Tom Tietenberg, 
‘The Tradeable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons’, in Dieter Helm (ed) Climate 
Change Policy (Oxford University Press, 2005) 167–8. 
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emissions units, is designed to ensure that emissions will be reduced by 
participants who can do so most efficiently and inexpensively. However, 
when free carbon units are allocated to coal-fired electricity generators, 
they do not have a strong financial incentive to change their business 
model to achieve cost-effective methods of emissions reduction.
156
 
Consequently, the carbon pricing mechanism would operate in a more 
economically efficient manner if free carbon units were not allocated to 
the coal-fired electricity sector. 
 
Given the above factors, the provision of transitional assistance in the 
form of free carbon units has the potential to interfere with the 
effectiveness of the carbon pricing mechanism. Changes in behaviour that 
would occur in the absence of transitional assistance, such as increased 
energy efficiency or other emissions reduction efforts, may be prevented 
or delayed. The allocation of free carbon units partially shields the coal-
fired electricity sector from the impact of a carbon price, reduces the 
economic efficiency of the mechanism and has a detrimental impact on 
overall emissions reduction. 
 
(b) Transitional Assistance may Result in Windfall Gains for Coal-
Fired Electricity Generators where Carbon Costs are Passed on 
to Consumers  
When a coal-fired electricity generator is allocated free carbon units, it 
does not have to pay the carbon price for emissions covered by those 
units. The generator may still choose to pass the ‘carbon costs’ on to 
retailers and/or consumers of coal-fired electricity.
157
 This could result in 
windfall gains for coal-fired electricity generators as an outcome of 
transitional assistance. 
                                                                
156  Such as increasing energy efficiency or using alternative electricity-generation techniques. 
157 Allocating permits for free to corporations provides them with an incentive to pass on  the 
cost to consumers to reap windfall profits: Alex Lo and Clive Spash, ‘Australia’s Carbon 
Tax: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?’ (2012) 23(1) The Economic and Labour Relations 
Review 67, 75. ‘Both simple economic theory and electricity futures markets have pointed 
towards a very large proportion of the carbon price being passed through into wholesale 
electricity prices at the commencement of a carbon pricing scheme in Australia. Based on 
daily average pool prices on the first day of carbon pricing this expectation has held true’: 
Carbon Pricing in the NEM: Day One (Frontier Economics, July 2012) 
<http://www.frontier-
economics.com/_library/publications/frontier%20australia%20paper%20-
%20carbon%20price%20in%20the%20nem%20-%20day%20one.pdf.> (accessed 26 
November 2012).  
 31 
 
Such a scenario has occurred previously within the European Union 
emissions trading scheme. Free emissions permits were allocated to 
electricity generators during the first two phases of the scheme,
158
 but 
‘carbon costs’ were still passed on by these companies, resulting in 
windfall gains for the electricity sector.
159
 Pass-through rates of the 
carbon price in the European Union scheme varied between 60 per cent 
and 100 per cent, depending on the carbon intensity of the generation 
complex and various other market or technology specific factors.
160
 
Caution is needed in generalising from this experience as the 
characteristics of European electricity markets, in particular the mix of 
energy sources and the regulatory environment, are quite different from 
Australia.
161
 The extent to which carbon costs can be passed on in 
Australia is dependent upon a range of factors. These include the 
electricity generator’s ability to pass on costs in any wholesale 
contracts,
162 
the hedging portfolios of electricity retailers and the 
jurisdictional price caps on electricity supplied to consumers.
163
 
Electricity demand
164
 and the extent to which electricity grid 
arrangements expose coal-fired electricity generators to competition from 
lower-emissions generation,
165
 such as gas, is also a determining factor.
166
 
Where coal-fired electricity generators are connected to the same grid as 
                                                                
158  For a discussion of the effect of these free allocations on the emissions trading market see Kim 
Keats Martinez, Karsten Neuhoff and Misato Sato, ‘Allocation, Incentives and Distortions: The 
Impact of EU ETS Emissions Allowance Allocations to the Electricity Sector’ (2006) 6(1) 
Climate Policy 73. 
159  For further discussion see Yihsu Chen, Karsten Neuhoff and Jos Sijm, ‘CO2 Cost Pass Through 
and Windfall Profits in the Power Sector’ (2006) 6(1) Climate Policy 49; Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme Green Paper, above n 123, 347–8; Christoff, above n 18, 87. 
160  Chen, Neuhoff and Sijm, above n 159, 49. 
161  Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper, above n 123, 347. 
162  For discussion on whether this can be done under an emissions trading scheme, see Grant 
Anderson, ‘Transfer of Carbon Liability under the Proposed Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme’ (2010) 36 Monash Law Review 304, 315–19; Renee Garner and Rachael Wong, 
‘Passing Through Carbon Costs Under the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme’ (2010) 36 
Monash Law Review 260, 271–7. 
163  Anderson, above n 68, 938; Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper, above n 123, 
430. 
164  Strong Growth, Low Pollution: Modelling a Carbon Price, above n 75, 124. 
165  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 189. Highly emissions-intensive coal-
fired generators are likely to face an increase in their operating costs greater than the general 
increase in the level of electricity prices: Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 
(Cth) 183. 
166  Strong Growth, Low Pollution: Modelling a Carbon Price, above n 75, 126. 
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lower-emissions gas-fired electricity generators, passing on carbon costs 
in full renders them uncompetitive. 
 
However, the demand for electricity is relatively static.
167
 Garnaut states 
that, for electricity generators as a whole, most of the carbon costs are 
likely to be recouped from price increases.
168
 Coal-fired electricity 
generators that are able to pass on ‘carbon costs’ they have not actually 
paid, due to the allocation of free carbon units, could acquire windfall 
gains.
169
 This is the second potential detrimental impact of transitional 
assistance. 
 
(c) Transitional Assistance May Conflict with the Principles of 
Ecologically Sustainable Development 
The objects of transitional assistance provided under Part 8 of the Act are 
purely social and economic.
170
 In contrast, the carbon pricing mechanism 
is an instrument designed to achieve environmental objectives, such as 
reduction of emissions. The development and implementation of 
environmental policy in Australia must be guided by the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development (‘ESD’).171 These principles should 
guide the development and implementation of the entire carbon pricing 
mechanism, including the provision of transitional assistance. However, 
for the reasons outlined below, transitional assistance may conflict with 
the principles of ESD. 
 
(i) ESD Principle One: ‘Polluter Pays’ Principle 
The ‘polluter pays’ principle of ecologically sustainable development 
requires that those who generate pollution should bear the cost of 
containment, avoidance or abatement of pollution.
172
 Similarly, the 
                                                                
167  Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper, above n 123, 346. 
168  Garnaut Review, above n 52, 158. 
169  Lee Godden, Anne Kallies and Jacqueline Peel, Submission to Green Paper on a Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme (9 September 2008), 4 
<http://climatechange.gov.au/en/submissions/cprs-green-
paper/~/media/submissions/greenpaper/0271-godden-et-al.ashx>; Robyn Briese, ‘Climate 
Change Mitigation Down Under: Legislative Responses in a Federal System’ (2010) 13 Asia 
Pacific Journal of Environmental Law 75, 82. 
170  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 159.  
171  Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, above n 7, 3.1. This includes the Clean 
Energy Act 2011 (Cth), which is fundamentally a piece of environmental legislation. 
172  Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, above n 7, 3.5.4. See also Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Recommendation on the Implementation of the 
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Government has stated that the carbon pricing mechanism will make 
coal-fired electricity generators pay for the cost of the carbon pollution 
they emit.
173
 Under the mechanism, coal-fired electricity generators are 
required to pay a price for each tonne of carbon dioxide emitted. The 
carbon pricing mechanism would therefore appear to impose the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle upon coal-fired electricity generators by placing a price 
on carbon pollution. 
 
Transitional assistance in the form of free carbon units means that coal-
fired electricity generators do not have to pay the full costs of their 
carbon pollution. Each free carbon unit represents one tonne of carbon 
dioxide that can be emitted for free by coal-fired electricity generators. 
This form of transitional assistance therefore appears to contradict the 
‘polluter pays’ principle.174 
 
 (ii) ESD Principle Two: Economic and Environmental Considerations 
must be Effectively Integrated in Decision-Making Processes 
Another principle of ESD requires that economic and environmental 
considerations are effectively integrated into decision-making 
processes.
175
 The social and economic objects of Part 8 include ensuring 
energy security, supporting investor confidence, and compensating 
generators for loss of asset value as a result of the carbon price.
176
  
 
The objects stated for transitional assistance, and Part 8 in its entirety, are 
silent regarding environmental considerations. For example, the 
detrimental impact that allocation of free carbon units may have on the 
rate of emissions reduction does not appear to have been considered. This 
                                                                                                                       
Polluter-Pays Principle (C(74)223, 1974) I(2); Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Guiding Principles Concerning the International Economic Aspects of 
Environmental Policies (1972) 11 ILM 1172. 
173  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 183. 
174  Allocation of free emissions permits has been recognised as a contradiction of the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle: Markus Pohlmann, ‘The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme’ in David 
Freestone and Charlotte Streck (eds), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and 
Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2009) 338, 357, 365; Briese, above n 169, 82. 
175  Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, above n 7, 3.2, 3.4. The integration principle 
encapsulates the notion that the decision-making process should integrate long- and short-term 
economic, environmental, social and equity considerations: Lee Godden and Jacqueline Peel, 
Environmental Law: Scientific, Policy and Regulatory Dimensions (Oxford University Press, 
2010) 135–7. 
176  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 159. 
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may indicate that decisions regarding transitional assistance to coal-fired 
electricity generators have not effectively integrated economic and 
environmental considerations, conflicting with the second principle of 
ESD. 
 
Justifications for Transitional Assistance  
Given the abovementioned detrimental effects of transitional assistance, it 
is instructive to examine the justifications provided for this assistance. 
The objects of Part 8 advance three main arguments for transitional 
assistance:  
1. maintaining energy security;  
2. supporting investor confidence; and 
3. compensating coal-fired electricity generators for loss of asset 
value as a result of the carbon price. 
 
First, it is argued by commentators including Anderson
177
 that the impact 
of a carbon price on coal-fired electricity generators will lead to volatile 
electricity prices and potentially a reduction in the security of electricity 
supply. According to this argument, transitional assistance is required to 
maintain energy security. However, this ground for transitional assistance 
has been criticised by other commentators, who state that the introduction 
of a carbon price is highly unlikely to compromise energy security.
178
 
Garnaut recommends that energy security concerns could be addressed 
through the introduction of an Energy Security Council and the provision 
of transitional loan guarantees to emissions-intensive generators.
179
 
 
Both of these measures are instituted by the Clean Energy Future 
package. An Energy Security Council has been established to provide 
advice to the Government in the event that systemic risks to energy 
security emerge from the financial impairment of power stations arising 
from any source, including from the introduction of carbon pricing.
180
 
Transitional loan assistance to emissions-intensive coal-fired electricity 
                                                                
177  Anderson, above n 68, 935.  
178  Garnaut Review, above n 52, 23–4, 159; Grattan Institute, ‘Climate Package: Progress on Many 
Fronts, and the Means to Do Better’ (Media Release, 10 July 2011), 2 
<http://grattan.edu.au/static/files/assets/1aaf79fc/20110710_media-
release_climate_change_package.pdf>. 
179  Garnaut Review, above n 52, 159–62. 
180  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 17. 
 35 
generators may also be granted for the purpose of purchasing future 
carbon units at a Government auction or refinancing a loan relating to the 
generation complex.
181
 One of the objects of loan assistance is expressly 
stated to be maintenance of energy security.
182
 Given the introduction of 
an Energy Security Council and transitional loan assistance, the argument 
that transitional assistance is also required to maintain energy security 
may not be valid. 
 
Secondly, it is argued that transitional assistance is justified because the 
carbon price will impact the profitability and asset values of coal-fired 
electricity generators, increasing the perceived risk of investing in the 
energy sector.
183
 The Government states that: 
with the start of the mechanism, investors in new generation assets can 
account for the impact of a carbon price in their investment decisions. For 
this reason, the issue of free carbon units is only available for highly 
emissions-intensive coal-fired generation assets operating between 1 July 
2008 and 30 June 2010.
184
 
 
However, it is also arguable that investors in coal-fired electricity 
generation should have been accounting for the potential impact of a 
carbon price long before 30 June 2010. A carbon price has been a 
possibility since 2004, when a task force was established by the States 
and Territories to develop a model for a national emissions trading 
scheme.
185
 Given the substantial timeframe over which carbon pricing has 
been a possibility, the argument that transitional assistance is required to 
support investor confidence may also be unpersuasive. 
 
Finally, transitional assistance is justified as compensation to coal-fired 
electricity generators for loss of asset value resulting from the 
introduction of the carbon price.
186
 Garnaut and Wood state that there is 
no principled basis for government compensation to private enterprise 
                                                                
181  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 303B. 
182  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 220. 
183  Anderson, above n 68, 934–5. 
184  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 183. 
185  See Possible Design for a National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme, above n 6. 
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when reforms are introduced to address market failures.
187
 This would 
include the introduction of the carbon pricing mechanism to address the 
‘market failure’ of climate change.188 It does not appear that transitional 
assistance can be justified as compensation to coal-fired electricity 
generators for loss of asset value. 
 
Upon closer examination, all three arguments for transitional assistance 
are either unpersuasive
189
 or addressed through other measures, such as 
the Energy Security Council and transitional loan assistance. The 
provision of transitional assistance to coal-fired electricity generators is a 
questionable choice that may have several detrimental consequences. 
Given these consequences, it appears that transitional assistance detracts 
from the effectiveness of the carbon pricing mechanism and ultimately 
hampers the reduction of remissions from the coal-fired electricity sector. 
The carbon pricing mechanism alone is unlikely to constitute a legal 
instrument that will drive significant and rapid emissions reduction from 
Australia’s coal-fired electricity sector. Consequently, additional 
regulatory measures may be required to reduce emissions from the coal-
fired electricity sector. 
 
Additional Regulatory Measures to Reduce Emissions from the 
Coal-Fired Electricity Sector  
Earlier in this article, laws that currently regulate emissions from new and 
existing coal-fired electricity generation were outlined. With the 
introduction of the carbon pricing mechanism, the necessity of these laws 
comes into question. Laws to regulate emissions from coal-fired 
electricity generation can be divided into two main categories: laws that 
apply to new electricity generation and laws that apply to existing 
electricity generation. It is constructive to consider each set of laws 
separately.  
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(a) Laws to Regulate Emissions from New Coal-Fired Electricity 
Generation 
As discussed earlier, environmental and planning laws governing the 
approval of new coal-fired electricity generation are rarely applied to 
regulate emissions. Similarly, the Act does not purport to regulate or 
prohibit new coal-fired electricity generation. Under the carbon pricing 
mechanism, it is possible that new generators could still be approved and 
constructed, although they would not be eligible for transitional 
assistance or loan assistance, and may face significant difficulties in 
obtaining finance.
190
 Despite this possibility, several Australian 
Governments have taken the stance that, upon the introduction of the 
carbon pricing mechanism, it is unnecessary to regulate emissions from 
new coal-fired electricity generation. This position is expressed through 
Commonwealth and Victorian Government statements that emissions 
intensity standards for new coal-fired generation complexes are not 
required due to the carbon pricing mechanism.
191
 
 
Given the recent approval of a partially coal-fired power station in 
Victoria,
192
 this may be an unsatisfactory situation. As demonstrated, the 
carbon pricing mechanism, as it currently stands, will be an inadequate 
substitute for regulation of emissions from new coal-fired electricity 
generation.
193
 Ideally the Act should contain a prohibition on new coal-
fired electricity generation. In the absence of such a provision, it is 
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desirable for nationally consistent, mandatory conditions of approval to 
be imposed upon new coal-fired electricity generation requiring: 
 an emissions intensity standard of 0.80 or below; and  
 installation of CCS-ready equipment. 
 
(b) Laws to Regulate Emissions from Existing Coal-Fired 
Electricity Generation 
Laws that apply, or could be applied, to regulate emissions from existing 
coal-fired electricity generation are as follows: 
1. energy efficiency measures applying to electricity generation;194 
2. market-based mechanisms, such as the Queensland Gas 
Scheme;
195
  
3. direct regulation, such as feed-in tariff laws196 and the national 
large-scale Renewable Energy Target;
197
 and 
4. State and Territory environmental harm and pollution offences. 
 
Differences of opinion have been expressed about the necessity of these 
laws upon commencement of the carbon pricing mechanism.
198
 For the 
first two categories of law, however, there appears to be consensus . It is 
generally agreed that energy efficiency measures can usefully 
complement a carbon pricing mechanism.
199
 Conversely, it appears that 
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State market-based mechanisms have been deemed unnecessary.
200
 The 
former ACT and NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Schemes closed on 
30 June 2012 before the introduction of the carbon pricing mechanism on 
1 July 2012,
201
 and the Queensland Gas Scheme will be transitioned into 
an emissions trading scheme as soon as is practicable.
202
 
 
State and Territory offences of creating environmental harm or nuisance, 
and restrictions upon undertaking activities that cause pollution to the 
environment
203
 or disposal of contaminants or waste,
204
 could also be 
applied to regulate emissions from coal-fired electricity generation.
205
 
This is possible due to the wide legislative definitions of ‘environment’ 
and ‘environmental harm’,206 ‘pollution’, ‘contaminants’ and ‘waste’,207 
although, in practice, it is highly unlikely that State and Territory 
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environmental law offences will be applied to regulate emissions from 
coal-fired electricity generation. For example, a recent action brought 
against a coal-fired power station alleging that it was disposing of waste 
(carbon dioxide emissions) in a manner that was likely to harm the 
environment was summarily dismissed because the power station held an 
environmental protection licence.
208
 This case demonstrates the difficulty 
of challenging emissions from a coal-fired generation complex after 
environmental approval has been granted for the complex. Therefore, it is 
imperative that emissions from new coal-fired generation complexes are 
considered and regulated at the approval stage. 
 
Finally, direct regulation to reduce emissions from existing coal-fired 
electricity generation is the most controvertible category of law. This type 
of regulation seeks to impose pre-determined environmental outcomes on 
coal-fired electricity generators (or the electricity generation sector in 
general) through performance-based standards.
209
 Direct regulation, 
particularly the renewable energy target, has been criticised on a number 
of counts,
210
 including its alleged failure to encourage innovation and the 
lowest-cost methods of reducing emissions.
211
 Regulation directly aimed 
at low-emissions technology development and deployment must be 
designed in a manner that complements and leverages off the carbon 
pricing mechanism.
212
 Many commentators, including Garnaut, have the 
opinion that the renewable energy target does not meet these 
requirements and should be phased out.
213
 
 
It appears the Government is also taking this position. Statements have 
been issued describing the renewable energy target as ‘transitional 
                                                                
208  The environmental protection licence conferred lawful authority to emit carbon, which was a 
defence to the disposal of waste: Gray v Macquarie Generation [2010] NSWLEC 34 (22 March 
2010). Specifically, Pain J held at [57] that ‘it is not correct to say that the licence does not deal 
with carbon dioxide in such a way that there is no lawful authority to emit carbon dioxide 
provided under it’. 
209  Performance standards define a generator’s duty in terms of the problems it must solve or the 
goals it must achieve: Peter Grabosky, Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford University Press, 1998) 15. 
210  The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report, above n 94, 354; What Role for Policies to 
Supplement an Emissions Trading Scheme?, above n 198, 73–8.  
211  Garnaut Review, above n 52, 153; Gunningham, above n 154, 183–4.  
212  Investment Reference Group Report, above n 62, 10. 
213  Garnaut Review, above n 52, 157; Task Group on Emissions Trading Report, above n 6, 137; 
What Role for Policies to Supplement an Emissions Trading Scheme?, above n 198, xiii, xvii; 
Strategic Review of Australian Government Climate Change Programs, above n 21, 141.  
 41 
support for eligible renewable energy generators’214 and as providing 
support that is designed to progressively phase down as the carbon price 
matures.
215
 
 
Nevertheless, there is a strong argument that direct regulation has an 
important role to play alongside the carbon pricing mechanism.
216
 
Notably, the European Union emissions trading scheme has been 
successfully accommodated alongside direct regulation, such as 
mandatory targets for renewable energy.
217
 In the Australian context, 
reducing our current reliance upon coal-fired electricity generation is an 
extremely large challenge. The carbon pricing mechanism contains 
several features, such as transitional assistance, that may limit its 
effectiveness in reducing emissions from the coal-fired electricity sector. 
Additionally, electricity is a household necessity. Power notes that a 
carbon price resulting in higher electricity prices is therefore unlikely to 
significantly reduce demand for this necessity and to significantly reduce 
emissions from the electricity sector.
218
 
 
Given the above factors, it may be essential to retain direct regulation, 
such as the renewable energy target, which is designed specifically to 
encourage the dissemination of renewable electricity technologies and 
minimise the impact of coal-fired electricity.
219
 This could facilitate a 
faster and more effective switch away from coal-fired electricity 
generation and towards low-emissions and renewable energy, which in 
turn would significantly reduce Australia’s emissions. 
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Concluding Comments 
From 1 July 2012, the carbon pricing mechanism is Australia’s key legal 
instrument for reducing emissions from the coal-fired electricity sector. 
The mechanism contains a number of features that may reduce its 
effectiveness in changing the behaviour and business model of coal-fired 
electricity generators and reducing emissions from this sector. First, 
provisions that create a fixed price for carbon, and subsequent price 
ceiling, may prevent the carbon price from rising high enough to have a 
significant impact on coal-fired electricity generation until 2018. The 
carbon pollution cap also has the potential to become ‘leaky’ through the 
surrender of international emissions units and ACCUs, which may 
hamper actual reduction of emissions from coal-fired electricity 
generation. 
 
Most notably, the provision of transitional assistance has the potential to 
undermine the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of 
the carbon pricing mechanism, result in windfall gains for coal-fired 
electricity generators if carbon costs are passed on to consumers, and 
conflict with the principles of ESD. Given these factors, it is unlikely the 
carbon pricing mechanism will result in significant emissions reduction 
from coal-fired electricity generation for a number of years. This may not 
occur until 1 July 2018 onwards, when the carbon price ceiling is 
removed and the allocation of free carbon units has ceased. Certainly it 
will not act as a ‘silver bullet’ to achieve the kind of rapid and significant 
emissions reduction that is needed to meet Australia’s 2020 emissions 
reduction target.  
 
After 2020, assuming the carbon pricing mechanism is not repealed and 
the price of carbon rises significantly in flexible charge years, the 
mechanism will eventually achieve significant emissions reduction from 
the coal-fired electricity sector. If the carbon pricing mechanism is 
repealed in 2013 or 2014, while the carbon price remains relatively low, 
there is no carbon pollution cap and transitional assistance is provided, it 
will have had a negligible effect on reduction of emissions from the coal-
fired electricity generation sector. Instead, repeal of the carbon pricing 
mechanism in 2013 or 2014 may provide windfall gains for certain coal-
 43 
fired electricity generators who received cash payments as transitional 
assistance in 2012.
220
 
 
Given the above scenarios, it is therefore desirable to retain other laws 
regulating emissions from the coal-fired electricity sector. A suite of 
environmental and planning laws will be required to encourage 
behavioural change from the coal-fired electricity sector, increase the 
take-up of low-emissions and renewable energy sources and ensure 
significant emissions reduction.
221
 These laws should include energy 
efficiency requirements, the Renewable Energy Target, feed-in tariffs, 
and either a national prohibition on new coal-fired electricity generation 
or the imposition of national, mandatory emissions intensity standards 
and CCS-ready standards. 
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